We introduce a new semantics for justification logic based on subset relations. Instead of using the established and more symbolic interpretation of justifications, we model justifications as sets of possible worlds. We introduce a new justification logic that is sound and complete with respect to our semantics. Moreover, we present another variant of our semantics that corresponds to traditional justification logic.
Introduction
Justification logic is a variant of modal logic that includes terms representing explicit evidence. A formula of the form t : A means that t justifies A (or t represents evidence for A, or t is a proof of A). Justification logic has been introduced by Artemov [2, 3] to give a classical provability interpretation to S4. Later it turned out that this approach is not only useful in proof theory [3, 15] but also in epistemic logic [4, 5, 11, 12] . For a general overview on justification logic, we refer to [7, 8, 16] .
There are various kinds of semantics available for justification logic. Most of them interpret justification terms in a symbolic way. In provability interpretations [3, 15] , terms represent (codes of) proofs in formal system like Peano arithmetic. In Mkrtychev models [17] , which are used to obtain decidability, terms are represented as sets of formulas. In Fitting models [13] , the evidence relation maps pairs of terms and possible worlds to sets of formulas. In modular models [6, 14] , the logical type a justification is a set of formulas, too. Notable exceptions are [1, 9] where terms are interpreted as sets of possible worlds. However, these papers do not consider the usual term structure of justification logics. Also note that there are topological approaches to evidence available [10, 20, 21] , which, however, do not feature justifications explicitly in their language.
We investigate a family of justification logics that differ in their axioms and how the axioms are justified. We have two sets of axioms, the first axioms are:
• W 0 ⊆ W and W 0 = ∅ .
• V : W × L J → {0, 1} such that for all ω ∈ W 0 , t ∈ Tm, F, G ∈ L J : -V (ω, ⊥) = 0; -V (ω, F → G) = 1 iff V (ω, F ) = 0 or V (ω, G) = 1; -V (ω, t : F ) = 1 iff E(ω, t) ⊆ { υ ∈ W | V (υ, F ) = 1 }.
we derive by the condition on V in Definition 1 υ ∈ [⊥] or in other words υ ∈ (υ ′ ∈ W | V (υ ′ , ⊥) = 1) and hence V (υ, ⊥) = 1 and this contradicts the claim that υ ∈ W 0 .
Proof. Suppose M, ω s · t : A, i.e. E(ω, s · t) ⊆ [A].
E(ω, s · t) = E(ω, s + t + c ⋆ ) = E(ω, s) ∩ E(ω, t) ∩ E(ω, c ⋆ ).
Since intersection of sets is commutative this is the same as E(ω, t) ∩ E(ω, s) ∩ E(ω, c ⋆ ) = E(ω, t + s + c ⋆ ) = E(ω, t · s)
and hence E(ω, t · s) ⊆ [A] and therefore M, ω t · s : A.
So it does not make a difference, whether we first have evidence for B → A and then for B or vice versa. In other words, the order in which evidence is presented does not matter.
Completeness
To prove completeness we will construct a canonical model and then show that for every formula
Before we start with the definition of the canonical model, we must do some preliminary work. We will first prove that our logics are conservative extensions of classical logic. With this result we can argue, that the empty set is consistent and hence can be extended to so-called maximal L ⋆ CS -consistent sets of formulas. These sets will be used to build the W 0 -worlds in the canonical model.
Theorem 7 (Conservativity). All logics L
⋆ presented are conservative extensions of the classical logic CL, i.e. for any formula F ∈ L cp :
Proof. Since L ⋆ is an extension of CL the right-to-left direction is obvious. To prove the direction from left to right we use a translation t : L J → L cp :
This translation removes all justification terms from a given formula. Now we show by induction on the length of the derivation for some formula A that CL ⊢ t(A) whenever L ⋆ ⊢ A and note that t(A) = A for any A ∈ L cp . The cases where A is an axiom of CL is then obvious, since all logics L ⋆ contain all axioms of CL.
• cl: If A is an instance of some axiom scheme in L J , then t(A) = A is an instance of the same axiom scheme in CL.
• j+: t(s : A ∨ t : A → (s + t) : A) = A ∨ A → A, which is a classical tautology.
• jc
which is a classical tautology.
• j4,jd,jt: All translations have the form A → A, which is a classical tautology.
• modus ponens: If A is derived by modus ponens, then there is a formula B s.t. L ⋆ ⊢ B → A and L ⋆ ⊢ B and by induction hypothesis
and L cp ⊢ t(B) and hence t(A) can be derived in CL by modus ponens.
• axiom necessitation: If A is derived by axiom necessitation, then A is of the form c : B for some axiom B. But t(c : B) = B and B is an axiom.
Definition 8 (Consistency
and none of its proper supersets is.
Since all presented logics are conservative extensions of CL , we have the following consistency result.
Lemma 9 (Consistency of the logics). All presented logics are consistent.
As usual, we have a Lindenbaum lemma and the usual properties of maximal consistent sets hold, see, e.g., [16] .
Lemma 11 (Properties of maximal consistent sets). Given some logic L and its language
(2) F ∈ Γ if and only if ¬F ∈ Γ;
•
CS − consistent set of formulas .
• E C : With Γ/t := {F ∈ L J | t : F ∈ Γ} and
we define :
Now we must show that the canonical model is indeed an L ⋆ CS -subset model.
In order to prove this, we have to show that M C meets all the conditions we made for the valuation and evidence function and the constant specification i.e.:
and
So the proofs are here:
(1) Since the empty set is proven to be L 
⋆ -consistent and hence in both cases by Lemma 11 (3)
(c) From left to right: Suppose V C (Γ, t : F ) = 1, then by Definition 12 t : F ∈ Γ. Hence with the definition of Γ/t we obtain F ∈ Γ/t. So for each ∆ ∈ E C (Γ, t), F ∈ ∆ (again by Definition 12). Hence for these ∆ it follows by the definition of
We define a world ∆ by ∆ := Γ/t. Since ∆ ∈ P(L J ) we can be sure that ∆ exists, i.e. ∆ ∈ W . Since t : F ∈ Γ it follows that F ∈ Γ/t and therefore F ∈ ∆. But obviously ∆ ⊇ Γ/t hence ∆ ∈ E C (Γ, t).
In fact this is the case. Since Γ ∈ W C 0 we obtain that Γ is a maximal L ⋆ CS -consistent set of formulas and hence, whenever c ⋆ : A, c ⋆ : (A → B) ∈ Γ then by jc ⋆ we obtain c ⋆ : B ∈ Γ. This means that whenever A ∈ ∆ and A → B ∈ ∆ then B ∈ ∆. Hence ∆ = Γ/c ⋆ is closed under modus ponens and therefore ∆ ∈ W C MP . So together with the former reasoning ∆ ∈ E(Γ, c ⋆ ).
To prove this, we start by an observation on the relation between the sets Γ/(s + t) and Γ/s for
0 we obtain ¬(t :⊥) ∈ Γ. Hence ⊥ ∈ Γ/t. Therefore Γ/t is L ⋆ CS -consistent and can be expanded by the Lindenbaum Lemma to a maximal L ⋆ CS -consistent set ∆ ⊇ Γ/t with ∆ ∈ W C 0 and ∆ ∈ E C (Γ, t).
CS -consistent and t : F → F is an instance of the jt-axiom, we conclude that F ∈ Γ. Since F was arbitrary we obtain Γ ⊇ Γ/t and hence Γ ∈ E C (Γ, t).
(e) Suppose for some ∆ ∈ E C (Γ, !t), hence ∆ ⊇ Γ/!t. Then assume for some arbitrary F ∈ L J , V (Γ, t : F ) = 1 i.e. by Definition 12 t : F ∈ Γ. Since Γ is maximal L ⋆ CS -consistent and t : F →!t : (t : F ) is an instance of the j4-axiom we obtain !t : (t : F ) ∈ Γ and hence t : F ∈ Γ/!t. But then t : F ∈ ∆ and by Definition 12 it follows that V C (∆, t : F ) = 1. Since F was an arbitrary formula and ∆ an arbitrary world of E C (Γ, !t) we conclude that the condition holds.
Hence A ∈ Γ/c and for all ∆ ∈ E C (Γ, c) we obtain A ∈ ∆ and therefore 
Proof.
In this part we present an alternative definition of subset models for justification logic that directly interprets the application operator. Hence we work with the standard language of justification logic and we consider the j-axiom instead of the axiom (c ⋆ ).
Syntax
In this section, justification terms are built from constants c i and variables x i according to the following grammar:
This set of terms is denoted by Tm A . The operations · and + are left-associative and ! binds stronger than anything else. Formulas are built from atomic propositions p i and the following grammar:
The set of atomic propositions is denoted by Prop and the set of all formulas is denoted by L A J . Again we use the other logical connectives as abbreviations. As in the first section, we investigate again a whole family of logics. They are arranged in two sets of axioms. The first set, denoted by L A α contains the following axioms:
cl all axioms of classical propositional logic;
The other is identical to L ⋆ β (modulo the different language) and contains: j4 t : A →!t : (t : A); jd t :⊥→⊥; jt t : A → A.
For the sake of uniformity we denote this set of axioms by L There are no differences between these logics and the ones of the former section except in case of application. Therefore we skip all the details already mentioned and proved before. CS and L A CS are defined as before except that the corresponding logic has changed as mentioned. And deducing formulas in L A CS works the same as in the previous section.
Semantics
meets the following condition for terms of the form s · t:
where we use
The set APP ω (s, t) contains all formulas that are colloquially said derivable by applying modus ponens to a formula justified by s and a formula justified by t.
Truth in an L A CS -subset models is defined as before.
Definition 17 (Truth in L
A CS -subset models). Let M = (W, W 0 , V, E) be an L A CS -subset model, then for a world ω ∈ W and a formula F we define the relation as follows:
Soundness
Theorem 18 (Soundness of L A CS -subset models). For any justification logic L A , any constant specification CS and any formula F :
CS − subset models M and all ω ∈ W 0 . Proof. The proof is by induction on the length of the derivation of F and it is analogue to the proof of Theorem 3. The only thing that changes is the case, where F is an instance of the j-axiom: Then From the definition of APP ω (r, s) we conclude that B ∈ APP ω (s, t). So for all υ ∈ E(ω, s · t) we obtain by the requirements of E that V (υ, B) = 1 hence E(ω, s · t) ⊆ [B] . From this, the fact that ω ∈ W 0 and the requirements of V in W 0 we obtain V (ω, s · t : B) = 1, which is by Definition 17 M, ω s · t : B.
Completeness
Before we start defining a canonical model, we have to do the same preliminary work for L A CS as we had to do in the previous section for L ⋆ CS . Since the logics L ⋆ CS from the former section differ only in one axiom, i.e. j replaces jc ⋆ , we skip all the parts that are already done and focus on the changes that it brings about.
As before, we have a conservativity and consistency result.
Theorem 19 (Conservativity). All logics L
A presented are conservative extensions of the classical logic CL, i.e. for any formula F ∈ L cp :
All other ingredients that we needed in the former section to define and further develop the canonical model were generally defined and proven and can be adopted without additional effort.
To prove completeness we define a canonical model as follows:
Definition 21 (Canonical Model). For a given logic L
A and a constant specification CS we define the canonical model
Now we must show that such a canonical model is in fact a subset model.
Lemma 22. The canonical model M C is an L
A CS -subset model. Proof. In order to prove that, we have to proceed in the same way as in the previous section, i.e. showing that M C meets all the conditions we made for the valuation and the evidence function as well as the constant specification.
(1) W 0 = ∅.
(e) if j4 in L:
Since the canonical model is defined in the same way as the one of L ⋆ CS -subset models, the corresponding proofs can be reused (see Lemma 13) . Nevertheless, there is some difference. Instead of showing that
. Hence for all F s.t. s · t : F ∈ Γ we know that F ∈ ∆. Hence by the definition of V C , we have V (∆, F ) = 1 and therefore ∆ ∈ [F ]. It remains to show: if F ∈ APP Γ (s, t) then s · t : F ∈ Γ. Suppose for some formula F that F ∈ APP Γ (s, t) then by definition of APP Γ (s, t) we know that there is a formula H s.t.
. By using Lemma 22 (2c) we conclude V C (Γ, s : (H → F )) = 1 and V C (Γ, t : H) = 1. Hence by the definition of V C we obtain s : (H → F ) ∈ Γ and t : H ∈ Γ and since Γ is maximal L A CS -consistent and s : (H → F ) → (t : H → s · t : F ) is an instance of the j-axiom we conclude that s · t : F ∈ Γ.
Lemma 23 (Truth Lemma
Theorem 24 (Completeness). Given some constant specification CS then
Proof. The proof is analogue to the one of Theorem 15.
Artemov's aggregated evidence and L ⋆

CS -subset models
Artemov [1] considers the case in which we have a database, i.e. a set of propositions Γ = {F 1 , . . . F n } with some kind of probability estimates and in which we also have some proposition X that logically follows from Γ. Then we can search for the best justified lower bound for the probability of X. He presents us a nice way to find this lower bound. To find it, he assumes probability events u 1 , . . . , u n , each of them supporting some proposition in Γ, i.e. u i : F i , and calculates some aggregated evidence e(u 1 , . . . , u n ) for X with them. The probability of e then provides a tight lower bound for the probability of X.
The trick he uses is the following:
(1) First he collects all subsets ∆ i of Γ which support X, i.e. ∆ i ⊢ X, and creates a new evidence t i from all the corresponding u ij s.t. u ij :
(2) In the second step he combines all these new pieces of evidence to a new evidence (the so-called aggregated evidence) that actually is the greatest evidence supporting X.
The model he has in mind contains some evaluation in a probability space (Ω, F , P ) with a mapping ⋆ from propositions to Ω and evidence terms to F that meets some restrictions (for more details on this see [1] ).
Step (1) is to create a new evidence t i for each ∆ i described above, which consists of the intersection of the corresponding u ij 's.
Step (2) then is to union all these pieces of evidence to a new so-called aggregated evidence:
is an evidence for X obtained by step (1)}.
On the syntactic side evidence terms are built from variables u 1 , . . . , u n , constants 0 and 1 and operations ∩ and ∪, where st is used as an abbreviation for s ∩ t. With this we can built a free distributive lattice L n where st is the meet and s∪t is the join of s and t, 0 is the bottom and 1 the top element of this lattice. Moreover Artemov defines formulas in a usual way from propositional letters p, q, r, . . . by the usual connectives and adds formulas of the kind t : F where t is an evidence term and F a purely propositional formula.
The logical postulates of the logic of Probabilistic Evidence PE are:
(1) axioms and rules of classical logic in the language of PE;
1 : A, where A is a propositional tautology, 0 : F , where F is a propositional formula; (5) t : X → s : X, for any evidence terms s and t such that s t in L n .
Artemov presents Soundness and Completeness proofs connecting PE with the presented semantic, for more details see [1] .
Before we can start adapting Artemovs approach to our models, we have to⋆ CS -subset model if the valuation function and the evidence function meet the additional conditions respectively are redefined as follows: V : W × L prob → {0, 1} where all conditions listed in Definition 1 remain the same. For all ω ∈ W 0 and for all s, t ∈ Tm Proof. The proof is by induction on the length of the derivation of F :
• If F is derived by axiom necessitation or modus ponens or is an instance of axiom (1), then the proof is the analogue as in Theorem 3 since the relevant definitions have remained the same.
• If F is an instance of axiom (2) then the proof is analogue to the proof of Lemma 5: Suppose M, ω s : (A → B) and M, ω t :
Hence for all υ ∈ E(ω, st) we have V (υ, A → B) = 1 and V (υ, A) = 1 and υ ∈ E(ω, c ⋆ ) and therefore V (υ, B) = 1. Hence E(ω, st) ⊆ [B] and we obtain M, ω st : B.
• If F is an instance of axiom (3) then F = (s :
and since ω ∈ W 0 we obtain M, ω s ∪ t : A.
• If F is an instance of axiom (4) then either F = 1 : A for some axiom A or 0 : G for some formula G. Suppose F = 1 : A for some axiom A. We assume that M, ω A for all ω ∈ W 0 , hence E(ω, 1) = W 0 ⊆ [A] and therefore M, ω 1 : A for all ω ∈ W 0 . Suppose F = 0 : G: For any ω ∈ W 0 we have E(ω, 0) = ∅ by Definition 26. Since ∅ is a subset of any subset of W , we obtain E(ω,
• F is an instance of axiom (5) . Assume M, ω t : X for some term t and some formula X and let s t. By (2) we find t = s ∪ t. Thus E(ω, t) = E(ω, s ∪ t) = E(ω, s) ∪ E(ω, t)
and therefore E(ω, s) ⊆ E(ω, t). The assumption M, ω t : X means that E(ω, t) ⊆ [X]. So we get E(ω, s) ⊆ [X] and conclude M, ω s : X.
Theorem 28 (model existence). There exists a PE-adapted L ⋆ CS -subset model.
Proof. We construct a model M = {W, W 0 , V, E} as follows:
• W = W 0 = {ω}.
• The valuation function is built bottom up:
(1) V (ω, ⊥) = 0;
(2) V (ω, P ) = 1, for all P ∈ Prop; • E(ω, t) = {ω} if t ≥ 1 ∅ otherwise.
It is straightforward to show that M is indeed a PE-adapted L ⋆ CS -subset model. Let us only show the condition E(ω, s ∪ t) = E(ω, s) ∪ E(ω, t).
Suppose first s, t ≥ 1, Then E(ω, s ∪ t) = ∅ = E(ω, s) = E(ω, t) and hence the claim follows immediately.
Suppose at least one term of s and t is in greater than 1, then E(ω, s) = {ω} or E(ω, t) = {ω} and hence E(ω, s) ∪ E(ω, t) = {ω} and since s ≤ s ∪ t and t ≤ s ∪ t we obtain s ∪ t ≥ 1 and therefore E(ω, s ∪ t) = {ω}, so the claim holds.
Note that we cannot use the canonical model to show that adapted subset models exists since in the canonical model E(Γ, s ∪ t) ⊆ E(Γ, s) ∪ E(Γ, t).
However, in an adapted model we need these sets to be equal (see Definition 26) since otherwise axioms (3) and (5) would not be sound.
Conclusion
We introduced a new semantics, called subset semantics, for justifications. So far, often a symbolic approach was used to interpret justifications. In our semantics, justifications are modeled as sets of possible worlds. We also presented a new justification logic that is sound and complete with respect to our semantics. Moroever, we studied a variant of subset models that corresponds to traditional justification logic.
Subset models provide a versatile tool to work with justifications. In particular, we can naturally extend them with probability measures to capture uncertain justifications. In the last part of the paper, we showed that subset models subsume Artemov's approach to aggregating probabilistic evidence.
